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1. Introduction. 
A research study on the procedures to protect an unlawfully 
dismissed employee entails the need to examine a particularly complex 
legislative framework, both on the Italian side and on the European side. 
On the one hand, this is due to the fact that a common “corpus” of 
rules directly applicable within the EU, which equally protects all the 
unlawfully dismissed EU Member States’ employees, does not currently 
exist.  
Art. 153.1.d) of the Treaty on the Functioning on the European 
Union grants the European Institutions the right to adopt harmonizing 
directives and common minimum standards of protection regarding the 
“protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated”.  
However, such a provision has not been implemented yet, and 
might not be implemented in the future, since the exercise of the 
legislative power by the European Institution on dismissal issues is 
subject to the unanimity rule1.   
On the other hand, each EU Member State is free to determine the 
protection rules it wants to grant – pursuant to Art. 30 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights – to the unlawfully dismissed employee (i.e.: 
reinstatement, rehiring, payment of an indemnity, and so on) with the 
only restrictions deriving from the principles and the rules of the 
European Law regarding specific aspects of the termination of 
employment relationships. These include, among others, the restriction to 
                                                            
1 Please, see G. HEERMA VAN VOSS, Common ground in European dismissal Law, Keynote 
Paper, 4th Annual Legal Seminar European Labour Law Network, 24-25 November 2011, 
Protection against Dismissal in Europe-Basic Features and Current Trends, in 
www.labourlawnetwork.eu; N. F. HENDRICKX, European Labour Law after the Lisbon Treaty: 
(Re-visited) Assessment of Foundamental Social Rights, in R. Banplain, F. Hendrickx, Labour 
Law between change and tradition: Liber Amicorum Antoine Jacobs, in Bulletin of 
Comparative Labour Relations, 2011, no. 78, 75 ss.; M.V. BALLESTRERO, Europa dei mercati e 
promozione dei diritti, in Working Papers Centro studi di Diritto del Lavoro Europeo 
“Massimo D’Antona”, INT, 2007, 55, in 
http://www.lex.unict.it/eurolabor/ricerca/wp/wp_int.htm; P. K. MADSEN, Flexicurity: A New 
Perspective on Labour Markets and Welfare States in Europe, in Tilburg Law Review, 2007, 
no. 1-2, 57 ss.; MUTARELLI M.M., Il ruolo potenziale dei diritti sociali fondamentali nel 
Trattato costituzionale dell’Unione Europea, in WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”, INT, 
2007, no. 54; F. HENDRICKX, Flexicurity and the EU Approach to the Law on Dismissal, in 
Tilburg Law Review, 2007, 14, no. 1-2, 90 ss.; N. BRUUN, Protection against unjustified 
dismissal (Article 30), in B.Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Baden-Baden, 2006, 337 ss.; M.T. CARINCI, Il rapporto di lavoro al 
tempo della crisi: modelli europei e flexicurity "all’italiana" a confronto, in Giorn. Dir. Lav. 
Rel. Ind., 2012, no. 36, 4 ss.;  S. GIUBBONI, Lavoro e diritti sociali nella “nuova” Costituzione 
europea. Spunti comparatistici, in WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”, INT, 2004, no. 5; M. 
GRANDI, Il diritto del lavoro europeo. Le sfide del XXI Secolo, in Dir. Rel. Ind., 2007, 1022 
ss. 
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dismiss an employee who refuses the transformation of his/her 
employment from full-time into part-time (or vice-versa, see Art. 5.2. of 
EU Directive 97/81), as well as the prohibition to dismiss cause of a 
transfer of undertaking (please, see Art. 4.1 of the Directive 2001/23) as 
well as the prohibition to dismiss for discriminatory reasons (see EU 
Directives 2006/54, 2000/43 e 2000/78)2. 
The present study focuses on the comparison between the 
protective measures granted to unlawfully dismissed employees under 
the Italian Law and the Maltese one. In particular, it is firstly aimed at 
trying to find a response to the issue whether the protective “measures” 
granted to Italian unlawfully dismissed employees (considering the way in 
which the provided protective measure is actually applied by the judges) 
may be deemed “stronger” than those granted to the Maltese ones or 
vice-versa.  
Secondly, that study is also aimed at understanding whether the 
differences between the Maltese Law (please, see Section 81 of the 
Employment and Industrial Relations Act-EIRA) and the Italian Law 
(please, see Art. 18 of the Law No. 300 of 1970, so-called Workers’ 
Statute) are nowadays more apparent than real. 
Finally, the present study constitutes:  
a) an “attempt” to show that, although a common corpus of 
rules directly applicable within EU - which equally protects all the 
unlawfully dismissed employees - does not currently exist, it is also true 
that EU Member States are actually implementing by themselves a “new 
universal” European Law; 
b) an “example” of how different legislative models (i.e.: the 
Italian legislative model and the Maltese one) could blend together. 
 
 
                                                            
2 L. CALCATERRA, Diritto al lavoro e diritto alla tutela contro il licenziamento ingiustificato. 
Carta di Nizza e Costituzione italiana a confronto, in W.P. C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”, 
INT, 2008, no. 58, 28 ss.; G. BALDACCHINO, European Labour Law: Some Reflections on a 
Cultural Collision, in The Employer (Journal of the Malta Employers’ Association), January 
2001, 27 ss.; Id., Malta & the European Union: A Comparative Study on Social Policy, 
Employment & Industrial Relations, Malta, Malta Employers’ Association, 2000; Id., 
Competitiveness versus Social Cohesion: Employment-Creation Policies in Malta & the 
European Union, paper presented at the Annual EDRC Conference, May 1999, in P.G. 
Xuereb, ed. Getting Down to Gearing Up for Europe, Malta, EDRC, 1999, 259 ss. 
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2. Remedies applied in case of unfair dismissal: the 
Italian “hyper-regulation” against the Maltese 
“deregulation”. 
Before examining criteria taken into consideration by the Maltese 
judges and the Italian ones in order to apply measures granted to 
unlawfully dismissed employees, it is important to examine the most 
significant differences between the Law in force in Malta and the one in 
force in Italy. 
Firstly, both the unlawfully dismissed Italian employees and the 
Maltese ones are entitled to be reinstated-rehired or to be paid a 
compensation aimed at restoring the damage suffered by reason of the 
unfair dismissal (please, see Art. 18 of the Law No. 300 of 1970 and 
Section 81 of the EIRA). 
However, the Law in force in Italy expressly prescribes whether 
the judge has to order the reinstatement/rehiring of the employee or the 
payment of an indemnity for damages in favour of that employee, while - 
in accordance with the Law in force in Malta - that option is always up to 
the judge (please, see Section 81 of the EIRA).   
In other words, the Italian judge, unlike the Maltese one, is 
prevented from deciding whether to order the reinstatement (i.e.: the so-
called “tutela reale”), the re-hiring (i.e.: the so-called “tutela 
obbligatoria”), or the payment of the indemnity for damages on the basis 
of his/her discretionary evaluations. 
In particular, pursuant to the current Art. 18, par. 4th, of the Law 
No. 300 of 1970, in case of unfair disciplinary dismissal for “just cause” or 
for “subjective reasons”, the dismissed employee is entitled to be 
reinstated if “the contested behaviour does not subsist or” whether “that 
behavior could have been sanctioned with a conservative measure 
according to the provision of the bargaining agreement or … the 
applicable disciplinary codes”. By the way, the same employee has the 
right to opt for the payment of an indemnity instead of the reinstatement 
equal to fifteen months of salary compared to the overall actual annual 
compensation. 
The Italian Law also prescribes that - in all “other cases” - if the 
judge ascertains the lack of  “just cause” or subjective reasons of the 
served dismissal, he/she may simply order the employer to pay a global 
indemnity for damages ranging between a minimum of twelve up to a 
maximum of twenty-four months of salary compared to the overall actual 
annual compensation (please, see the above-mentioned Art. 18, par. 5th). 
The same judge has the duty to explain, through his/her decision, the 
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criteria which he/she has decided to apply in order to quantify the 
amount of compensation3.  
Moreover, the Italian judge has to order the employer (i.e.: it is 
mandatory!) to pay to the unlawfully dismissed employee an indemnity 
aimed at restoring the damage suffered by the employee during the 
period comprised between the date of dismissal and the judge’s order 
(i.e.: of reinstatement, rehiring or compensation), including social 
security contribution payment and deducting the salary that the 
employee earned or might have earned during the same period (please, 
see again Art. 18, par. 2nd). 
Similar regulations are provided in case of unfair dismissal for lack 
of business/financial reasons (i.e.: the so-called “objective reasons”). In 
fact, regarding this latter case, whether the judge ascertains that “the 
contested behavior that grounded the dismissal for objective reasons 
does not clearly4 subsist”, he/she has the faculty to order (i.e.: it is not 
                                                            
3 For an exhaustive framework on this matter, please see: AA.VV., La Riforma del lavoro. 
Primi orientamento giurisprudenziali dopo la Riforma Fornero, 2013, Giuffrè, Milano; M. 
BARBIERI, D. DALFINO, Il licenziamento individuale nell’interpretazione della legge Fornero, 
aggiornato al d.l. 28 giugn0 2013, n. 76 c.d. Pacchetto Lavoro, 2013, Cacucci, Bari; F. 
CARINCI,  Il nodo gordiano del licenziamento disciplinare, in Lav. Giur., 2013, 5 ss.; F. 
CARINCI,  Il nodo gordiano del licenziamento disciplinare, in Lav. Giur., 2013, 5 ss.; C. 
CESTER, I licenziamenti dopo la legge n. 92 del 2012, 2013, Cedam, Padova; C. CESTER, I 
licenziamenti dopo la legge n. 92 del 2012, 2013, Cedam, Padova; M. CINELLI, G. FERRARO, O. 
MAZZOTTA, Il nuovo mercato del lavoro dalla riforma Fornero alla legge di stabilità 2013, 
2013, Giappichelli, Torino; C. COLOSIMO, Prime riflessioni sul sindacato giurisdizionale nel 
nuovo sistema di tutele in caso di licenziamento illegittimo: l’opportunità di un approccio 
sostanzialista, in Dir. Rel. Ind., 2012, 1024 ss.; M. PERSIANI, S. LIEBMAN, Il nuovo diritto del 
mercato del lavoro. La legge n. 92 del 2012 (c.d. Riforma Fornero) dopo le modifiche 
introdotte dalla legge n. 99 del 2013, 2013, Utet, Padova; M. PERSIANI, S. LIEBMAN, Il nuovo 
diritto del mercato del lavoro. La legge n. 92 del 2012 (c.d. Riforma Fornero) dopo le 
modifiche introdotte dalla legge n. 99 del 2013, 2013, Utet, Padova; AA.VV., Commentario 
alla riforma Fornero (l. n. 92/2012 e l. n. 134/2012)-Licenziamenti e rito speciale, contratti, 
ammortizzatori e politiche attive, a cura di Carinci F._Miscione M., in Dir. Prat. Lav., 2012, 
suppl. al n. 33; AA.VV., Il diritto del lavoro dopo la «riforma Fornero» (l. n. 92/2012 e l. n. 
134/2012), in Lav. Giur., 2012, 843 ss.; M. BARBIERI, D. DALFINO, Il licenziamento individuale 
nell’interpretazione della legge Fornero, aggiornato al d.l. 28 giugn0 2013, n. 76 c.d. 
Pacchetto Lavoro, 2013, Cacucci, Bari; C. CESTER, Il progetto di riforma della disciplina dei 
licenziamenti: prime riflessioni, in Arg. Dir. Lav., 2012, 547 ss.; M. CINELLI, G. FERRARO, O. 
MAZZOTTA, Il nuovo mercato del lavoro dalla riforma Fornero alla legge di stabilità 2013, 
2013, Giappichelli, Torino; C. COLOSIMO, Prime riflessioni sul sindacato giurisdizionale nel 
nuovo sistema di tutele in caso di licenziamento illegittimo: l’opportunità di un approccio 
sostanzialista, in Dir. Rel. Ind., 2012, 1024 ss.; M. PERSIANI, S. LIEBMAN, Il nuovo diritto del 
mercato del lavoro. La legge n. 92 del 2012 (c.d. Riforma Fornero) dopo le modifiche 
introdotte dalla legge n. 99 del 2013, 2013, Utet, Padova. 
4 According to some scholars, the adjective “clear” would be not considered as relevant in 
that context but superfluous. In this regard, see V. SPEZIALE, La riforma del licenziamento 
individuale tra diritto ed economia, in Riv. It. Dir. Lav., 2012, 560 ss.; S. MAGRINI, Quer 
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mandatory!) the reinstatement of the dismissed employee5, while – in all 
the other cases – the judge has to order the employer to pay an 
indemnity for damages as provided under Art. 18, par. 6th (please, see 
again Art. 18, par. 7th)6. 
Moreover, the Law in force in Italy prescribes that the Italian 
judge has the duty (i.e.: it is mandatory!) to rule the reinstatement of 
the dismissed employee if the dismissal is deemed as discriminatory7 or if 
it has been served during the maternity leave, during the wedding period, 
during the period of incapacity for work or in breach of Art. 2110 Cod. 
Civ. and in case of dismissal based on an unlawful reason as provided 
under Art. 1345 of the Italian Civil Code (please, see Art. 18, par. 1st and 
7th).  
In particular, regarding these latter circumstances, Art. 18, par. 
1st, of the Law No. 300 of 1970 as amended by the Law No. 92 of 2012, 
provides that, irrespective of the number of workers employed by the 
company, employees – including managers - are entitled to be reinstated 
in their workplace besides the payment of an indemnity for damages 
equal to the salary which they would have earned from the date of the 
dismissal until the actual reinstatement, and not less than five months of 
salary (deducting the salary they might have earned during that period 
and including the payment of the relevant social security contribution). 
Such employees have the right to opt for the payment of an indemnity 
                                                                                                                                                         
pasticciaccio brutto (dell’art. 18), in Arg. Dir. Lav., 2012, 537 and C. PONTERIO, Il 
licenziamento per motivi economici, in Arg. Dir. Lav., 2013, 80 ss. Contra, see A. VALLEBONA, 
L’ingiustificatezza qualificata del licenziamento: fattispecie e oneri probatori, in Riv. Rel. 
Ind., 2012, 624 ss., considering that “the fact” mentioned by the Law should not be 
considered as a “material fact” and – therefore – the judge could evaluate whether the fact 
“does not clearly subsist” or not.  
5 According to some scholars, the Italian judge would not have “the power” to discretionally 
opt for the reinstatement or the award of compensation, but he would have the duty to 
reinstate the unfairly dismissed employee. On this matter, see, A. PALLADINI, La nuova 
disciplina in tema di licenziamenti, in Arg. Dir. Lav., 2012, I, 668 ss. Contra, see M. 
PERSIANI, Il fatto rilevante per la reintegrazione del lavoratore illegittimamente licenziato, in 
Arg. Dir. Lav., 2013, 1. 
6 This Regulation has been criticized by some scholars considering that the Italian judge has 
the power to discretionally choose between the reinstatement and the award of 
compensation. In this regard, please see A. PERULLI, Fatto e valutazione giuridica del fatto 
nella nuova disciplina dell’art. 18 St. Lav.: ratio ed aporie dei concetti normativi, in Arg. Dir. 
Lav., 2012, 791 ss., who - supporting the thesis of V. SPEZIALE, La riforma del licenziamento 
individuale tra diritto ed economia, in Riv. It. Dir. Lav., 2012, I, 560 ss. - has affirmed that 
the “new” Art. 18 would break Art. 3 Cost.  
7 M.T. CARINCI, Il licenziamento discriminatorio o «per motivo illecito determinante» alla luce 
dei principi civilistici: la causa del licenziamento quale atto unilaterale fra vivi a contenuto 
patrimoniale, in Riv. Giur. Lav., 2012, I, 641 ss. 
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instead of the reinstatement equal to fifteen months of salary compared 
to the overall actual annual compensation. 
The Italian Legislator has also specified that workers employed in 
“small” enterprises are not entitled to be reinstated whether they have 
been unlawfully dismissed. In fact, Art. 8 of the Law No. 606 of 1966, as 
amended by Art. 2 of the Law No. 108 of 1990, prescribes that – in such 
cases - the so-called “tutela obbligatoria” (i.e.: rehiring) has to be 
applied, allowing the employer to choose between the rehiring of the 
unfairly dismissed employee and the payment of an indemnity.  
Furthermore, the Law in force in Italy prescribes that – in cases of 
dismissal deemed ineffective because of the lack of an immediate 
indication of the actual grounds for dismissal when such a dismissal has 
been served – the employee has just the right to be paid a global 
indemnity for damages ranging between a minimum of six months up to 
a maximum of twelve months of salary compared to the overall actual 
annual compensation (please, see Art. 18, par. 6th). The Italian Law 
specifies that such a regulation has to be applied also in the event that 
the dismissal has been served to the employee without observing the 
procedure provided by Art. 7 of the Law No. 300 of 1970 or in breach of 
the procedure of dismissing prescribed by Art. 7 of the Law No. 604 of 
1966 with regards to cases of dismissal for objective reasons. 
Therefore, the “role” of Italian judges seems significantly limited 
by the “role” of Italian Legislator, since the latter one expressly specifies 
“if, how and when” such judges have to apply protection measures.  
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, Section 81 of the EIRA 
prescribes that, in case of unfair dismissal, Maltese judges do not have 
the duty to order the reinstatement/rehiring of the dismissed employee 
or to make an order of compensation. In fact, the Maltese Legislator only 
prescribes that:  
 “the Tribunal shall not order the reinstatement or re-
engagement” of the employee if he “is employed in such 
managerial or executive post as a special trust in the 
person of the holder of that post or his ability to perform 
the duties thereof” (please, see Section 81, par. 1st, of the 
EIRA); 
 employees are entitled to be reinstated “in (their) former 
employment” at the end of the period of “incapacity for 
work” and – therefore – even in the event that such 
MEASURES TO PROTECT UNLAWFULLY DISMISSED EMPLOYEES. THE ITALIAN LEGISLATIVE MODEL 
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employees have been unfairly dismissed during or after that 
period (please, see Section 36, par 15th, of the EIRA)8. 
On the other hand, as provided by Section 81 of the EIRA, the 
Maltese judge – in all the other cases where he ascertains that the 
dismissal is unfair9 (i.e.: for lack of a good and sufficient cause, for lack 
of formal requirements, for lack of grounds founding on redundancy, etc.) 
- has the duty to “consider (..)” whether “it would be practicable … for 
the complainant (i.e.: employee) to be reinstated or re-engaged by the 
employer” or not.  
In particular, this evaluation has to be made by the Maltese judge 
on the basis of his/her discretion “in accordance with equity”, “stating the 
terms on which it considers that it would be reasonable for the 
complainant to be so reinstated or re-engaged”. Therefore, if the Maltese 
judge “considers” the order of reinstatement/rehiring as not “practicable”, 
he/she may order the employer to pay an indemnity for damages.  
In this regard, it is relevant to note that Maltese judges’ discretion 
is extremely accentuated by Section 81, par. 2nd, of the EIRA which 
allows such judges to “make an award of compensation to be paid by the 
employer to the complainant, in respect of the dismissal” although the 
unfairly dismissed employee has expressly requested to be reinstated or 
rehired10. Moreover, Maltese judges may arbitrarily state a span of time 
within the indemnity has to be paid by employers (i.e.: one month, two 
months, four months, …).  
Furthermore, the Maltese Legislator has provided Maltese judges 
with “the power” to decide the amount of the payment of such an award 
since Section 81 of the EIRA - unlike Art. 18 of the Law No. 300 of 1970 
(related to the so-called “tutela reale”) and Art. 18 of the Law No 604 of 
1966 (related to the so-called “tutela obbligatoria”) - does not indicate a 
minimum or a maximum amount for the relevant payment of the 
indemnity for damages. In fact, Section 81, par. 2nd, of the EIRA only 
                                                            
8 However, the Maltese judge makes – very often – an order of compensation to be paid by 
the employer to the unlawfully dismissed employee during the period of incapacity to work. 
In this regard, see  Industrial Tribunal, 6th May 2013, no. 2221, in re Joseph Zammit v. 
Fondazzjoni Wirt Artna.   
9 For a lack of a good and sufficient cause, grounds of redundancy and – generally – when 
the judge “finds that the grounds of the complaint are well-founded”, please, see Art. 81, 
par. 1st, of the EIRA. 
10  In this regard, see Industrial Tribunal, 21st March 2013, no. 2215, in re Eric Micallef v. 
Bezzina Maritime Services; Id., 19th September 2013, no. 2238, in re Thomas Abela v. 
Preluna Ltd.; Id., 18th September 2012, no 2172, in re  Roderick Camilleri v. Polidano Grou; 
Id., 10th July 2012, no. 2160, in re  Shaun Bonello v. HSBC plc., where the Tribunal has 
decided to make an order of compensation (respectively, € 4.000,00; € 5.000,00; 3.000,00 
and € 1.500,00), although the dismissed employee expressly asked for being reinstated. 
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prescribes that, “in determining the amount of such compensation, the 
Tribunal shall take into consideration the real damages and losses 
incurred by the worker who has unjustly dismissed, as well as other 
circumstances. This might include many aspects (i.e.: such as: whether 
or not the dismissed employee has already found another job in a short 
time11 and/or the evaluation of the behaviour of that employee during the 
entire employment12), “including the worker’s age and skills as may affect 
the employment potential of the said worker” (see again Section 81 of 
the EIRA). Therefore, any decision regarding the amount of the indemnity 
to be paid to unlawfully dismissed employees is - once again - up to the 
discretion of Maltese judges. 
The same judge – in case of dismissal for discriminatory reasons - 
has the faculty to independently decide whether to “make such order as it 
deems necessary in order to remedy the breach or … make an award of 
compensation to be paid by the employer to the complainant” or – finally 
- “make such orders as it may deem necessary in order to remedy the 
breach” (see again Section 81 of the EIRA). 
Moreover, the Law in force in Malta is silent on the matter of 
measures to be applied by judges in case of unfair dismissal served 
during the wedding/maternity leave or the period of incapacity for work 
or for lack of formal requirements (for instance: dismissal served to the 
employee without allowing him/her to be heard or – generally – without 
following the procedure of dismissing prescribed by collective 
agreements). Therefore, Maltese judges, in accordance with Section 81 of 
the EIRA, have – also in such cases – the discretion to independently 
decide whether to order the reinstatement-rehiring of the unlawfully 
dismissed employee or, alternatively, to make an order of compensation.  
In addition, the Law in force in Malta does not say anything in the 
matter of measures to be applied during the period comprised between 
the date of dismissal and the date of the decision made by the Industrial 
Tribunal. 
 In this context, Maltese judges may (and therefore they are not 
obliged to) order the employer to pay an indemnity aimed at restoring 
the damage suffered by the employee during the period comprised 
between the date of dismissal and the judge’s order (of reinstatement, 
rehiring or compensation), including social security contribution. Such an 
                                                            
11  In this regard, see Industrial Tribunal, 3rd December 2013, no. 2255, in re Ronald 
Azzopardi v.Roosendaal Hotels Ltd; Id., 2nd April 2012, no. 2139, in re Robert Aquilina v. 
Camilmac Services Ltd; Id., 20th March 2012, no. 2136, in re Marvin Abdilla v. Engineering 
for Science & Industry Ltd.  
12  Please, see Industrial Tribunal, 31st January 2011, no. 2047, in re Joseph Abela v. 
Imperial Hotel (Goldvest Co. Ltd.). 
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indemnity often consists in the total amount of all salaries that the 
employee would have earned during that period. 
Therefore, while the protection of unfairly dismissed Italian 
employees is – at least apparently - committed to the “strict” Italian Law, 
the protection of the Maltese ones seems mainly committed to Maltese 
judges. 
3. Maltese “deregulation” and “power” recognized to 
Maltese judges: what about the principle of equality? 
As explained earlier, Section 81 of the EIRA grants Maltese judges 
with the power to decide – on the basis of his/her discretion and “in 
accordance with equity” - whether to make an order of 
reinstatement/rehiring of the unlawfully dismissed employee or to make 
an order of compensation to be paid by the employer to such an 
employee.  
On the one hand, such a provision is probably aimed at prompting 
Maltese judges to take into serious consideration all the circumstances-
facts concerning the dispute for the purpose of choosing the most 
appropriate protective measure.  
In other words, Section 81 of the EIRA is probably aimed at 
allowing such judges to make a decision in accordance with the 
peculiarities of the dispute to be decided. Actually, after examining 
decisions of the Industrial Tribunal, it has came to light that many 
Maltese judges have shown a good “awareness” of deciding the most 
appropriate measures to be applied. In fact, those judges have very often 
taken into account various relevant aspects such as the age and the 
seniority of the dismissed employee, the circumstance that the employee 
had already found a new job, the behaviour had by the same employee 
during the entire employment, and so on13. 
On the other hand, granting Maltese judges with such a power 
may lead to a breach of the principle of equality which should be 
recognized and therefore applied to all employment relationships. In 
particular, that principle – expressly mentioned by the Maltese 
Constitution and the EIRA - should govern any employment and its 
termination14. 
                                                            
13  Please see First Hall Civil Court, 7th July 2003, in re Lorenza Cascun v Healthcare 
Services Ltd and First Hall, Civil Court, 28th February 2003, in re Godwin u Oliver Navarro v 
Saviour Baldacchino. 
14 Please, see Artt. 14th, 45th (equality between men and women) of Constitution and Art. 1st 
(equal application of provisions of the EIRA), 26th (gender equality), 27th (equal salary). 
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However, pursuant to Section 81 of the EIRA, (for instance) two – 
or more – employees who have been dismissed for the same reason (i.e.: 
for lack of grounds of redundancy, for lack of a good and sufficient cause, 
for lack of formal requirements, for reasons of discrimination ….) may 
receive different protection by Maltese judges. In fact, while an employee 
may be reinstated or rehired by the judge who has to state his/her case, 
another one may obtain the payment of an indemnity for damages15. 
Moreover, Maltese judges may determine, case by case, different 
amounts of that indemnity. In fact, as explained earlier (see paragraph 
no. 2 of the present work), Section 81 of the EIRA does not indicate a 
minimum or a maximum amount for the relevant payment of the award. 
Therefore, the Maltese judge can quantify that award on the basis of 
his/her discretion, taking into account the criteria prescribed by the 
Maltese Law (i.e.: “real damages and losses incurred by the worker …, 
other circumstances, …”, please, see Section 81, par. 2nd, of the EIRA). In 
addition, Maltese judges may, on a case by case basis, also indicate 
different terms within the indemnity which has to be paid by employers16. 
Therefore, Section 81 of the EIRA should be amended in order to 
indicate the minimum and maximum amount of compensation to be 
given.  
                                                            
15 Please, see two cases of dismissals served to the employee during the period of 
incapacity to work decided by the Industrial Tribunal: Industrial Tribunal, 29th April 2013, 
no. 2218, in re Stephen Chircop v. Malta Freeport Terminals (order of reinstatement) and 
Id., 6th May 2013, no. 2221, in re Joseph Zammitv. Fondazzjoni Wirt Artna (order of 
compensation, € 4.998,00 in three consecutive payments). 
16 In this regard, see the followed cases where the Industrial Tribunal has declared unfair 
the dismissal served to the employees for lack of a good and sufficient cause: Industrial 
Tribunal, 30th January 2013, no. 2201, in re  Robert Cini v. Cube Relocations Ltd. (order of 
compensation: € 1.021,26); Id., 21st March 2013, no. 2215, in re Eric Micallef v. Bezzina 
Maritime Services (order of compensation: € 4.000,00); Id., 16th May 2013, no. 2225, in re 
Ray Borg v. Advanced Telecommunications Systems Ltd. (order of compensation: € 
16.000,00); Id., 19th September 2013, no. 2238, in re Thomas Abela v. Preluna Ltd (order 
of compensation: € 5.000,00). Regarding such decisions, on the one hand, the Industrial 
Tribunal has not specified parameters followed to determine the amount of the indemnity 
provided by Art. 81 of the EIRA. On the other hand, the same Tribunal has indicated 
different terms within the indemnity had to be paid by employers to unlawfully dismissed 
employees (i.e.: within one month, four months, two months, fifteen days, …). Regarding 
the discretion of Maltese judges to determine the amount of indemnity, see also some 
Industrial Tribunal, 27th March 2013, no. 2217, in re Petra Stock v. Carre Aviation Ltd Unfair 
Dismissal (order of compensation: € 24.000,00 – six monthly payments); Id., 11th June 
2013, no. 2231, in re  Sharon Grixti v. Dragonara Gaming Ltd. (order of compensation: € 
2.600,00 to be paid within one month); Id., 15th October 2013, no. 2246 (order of 
compensation of € 1.000,00 to be paid within one month). The Industrial Tribunal, through 
such decisions, has declared unfair the dismissal of some employees for lack of grounds of 
redundancy without specifying parameters taken into account to determine the amount of 
the indemnity.  
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Finally, it does not seem justifiable to provide Maltese judges with 
the faculty to decide measures to be applied in case of dismissal served 
to employees during the maternity-wedding-incapacity for work leave or 
grounded on discriminatory reasons. In fact - for instance - employees 
dismissed for the same discriminatory reason may be protected by means 
of “such [different] orders as [the Industrial Tribunal] deem(s) necessary 
in order to remedy the breach” (please, see Section 91 of the EIRA). 
On the other hand, judges should apply same protective 
measures, since such cases involve, not exclusively the right to work, but 
other essential rights such as the right to maternity, the right to a family, 
the right to health and the right not to be discriminated at workplace.  
In view of this, it is also relevant to remark that the so-called 
doctrine of precedent is not recognized by the Law in force in Malta. 
Therefore, the “power” which has been given to Maltese judges is 
tremendously strengthened since previous judicial decisions are not 
binding on subsequent proceedings and therefore any judge is free to 
decide “same” disputes in different “ways”. 
Furthermore, Maltese judges – unlike the Italian ones – are not 
even bound to respect guiding law principles affirmed by superior 
judiciary institutions (such as the Italian Supreme Court) which - through 
their decisions – might guarantee a uniform interpretation and application 
of the Maltese Law. However, such an institution does not exist in Malta.  
4. The Italian Legislative Model and the Maltese one: 
how much “real” are the differences between them? 
An in-depth analysis of the Maltese Legislative Model and the 
Italian one require to make a few general considerations.  
Although Section 81 of the EIRA grants the Maltese judge with the 
discretionary power to decide between the order of reinstatement-
rehiring and the order of compensation, it is also true that Art. 18 of the 
Law No. 300 of 1970 seems to grant - even if only indirectly - a similar 
power to the Italian judge (i.e.: in case of unfair dismissal for lack of just 
cause, subjective reasons or objective reasons). 
In this regard, it has to be noted that Art. 18 of the Law No. 300 
of 1970, before the amendments introduced by Art. 1, par. 42th, of the 
Law No. 92 of 28th June 2012 (i.e.: the so-called Riforma Fornero), 
provided for the Italian “anomaly” – according to some scholars – 
according to which the competent judge who declares the dismissal to be 
null and void, revoked or ineffective, has to order the reinstatement of 
the employee in the same work position s/he had before (the so-called 
“tutela reale”). The employee was - and actually he/she is still - entitled 
to waive the right to be reinstated opting for the employer’s payment of 
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an indemnity equal to 15 months of salary compared to the overall actual 
annual compensation (as provided under the 5th paragraph of the 
previous Art. 18, as amended by Law No. 108 of 1990).  
However, the “spreading” of the financial and occupational crisis – 
that, from 2010 onwards involved many European countries such as 
Greece, Spain and Slovakia – speeded up also in Italy the legal 
protections granted to unlawfully dismissed employees.  
Therefore, a “crucial point” of the Labour Law Reform 
implemented by the Law No. 92 of 2012 (i.e.: the so-called “Riforma 
Fornero”) and – more recently – by the Law No. 183 of 2014 (the so-
called Jobs Act) is the amendment of Art. 18 of the Law No. 300 of 1970.  
Such an amendment tremendously “weakened” the employee’s 
right of reinstatement in case of unlawful dismissal that before he/she 
was granted with, increasing the “chances” that the Italian judge may 
make an order of compensation.  
In fact, as stated earlier, pursuant to the current Art. 18, in case 
of unfair disciplinary dismissal for “just cause” or “subjective reasons”, 
the Italian judge does not have to order the reinstatement as – 
alternatively – he/she may provide for the payment of a global indemnity 
for damages ranging between a minimum of 15 up to a maximum of 27 
months of salary compared to the overall actual annual compensation.  
In particular, according to Art. 18, par. 4th, the difference between 
an order of reinstatement and an order of payment is grounded on the 
fact that the “contested behaviour does not subsist or” in case “that 
behaviour could have been sanctioned with a conservative measure 
according to the provision of the bargaining agreement or … the 
applicable disciplinary code” (i.e.: in case of “just cause” or “subjective 
reasons”). In fact, if the judge ascertains such a fact, he/she has to order 
the reinstatement of the unlawfully dismissed employee. “In all the other 
cases”, if the judge ascertains the lack of the just cause or of the 
subjective reasons of the served dismissal, he/she may simply order the 
employer to pay a global indemnity for damages (please, see Art. 18, 
par. 5th).   
In addition, pursuant to Art. 18, par. 7th, the Italian judge has the 
faculty to decide whether to order the reinstatement of the employee or 
the payment of the indemnity for damages when he ascertains that “the 
behaviour that grounded the dismissal for objective reasons does not 
clearly subsist”. In other words, if the Italian judge ascertains such a fact, 
he may order the reinstatement of the dismissed employee as provided 
by Art. 18, par. 4th. 
However, Art. 18 does not provide for a definition or explanation 
of the following sentences: “the contested behaviour does not subsist” 
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(i.e.: disciplinary dismissals) and “the behaviour that grounded the 
dismissal for objective reasons does not clearly subsist” (i.e.: dismissals 
grounded on economic reasons). Such sentences are very generic and 
they may be interpreted in many different ways. In addition, the Italian 
legislator does not list “all the other cases” mentioned by Art. 18, par. 
5th, allowing the Italian judge to determine such cases.  
Moreover, regarding cases of unfair dismissal for lack of just cause 
or subjective reasons, it is reasonable to ask: is it really possible to 
recognize a “legal border” between a “behaviour … [which] does not 
subsist” and “all the other cases” mentioned by Art. 18, par. 5th (but 
which cases?) making, respectively, an order of reinstatement or an 
order of payment of an indemnity for damages? Which is the quid pluris 
which allows Italian judges to make an order of reinstatement instead of 
payment of the indemnity?  
The Italian Legislator does not answer to such questions17. 
Furthermore, regarding cases of unfair dismissal for lack of 
objective reasons, what does the expression “behaviour …[which] does 
not clearly exist” mean? When should the judge ascertain whether the 
behaviour exists or do not exist, making, respectively, an order of 
reinstatement or an order of compensation?  
In view of this, it seems that the Italian Legislation has left the 
judge the task to give meaning to the above-mentioned sentences and, 
consequently, to decide, case by case - as the Maltese judge is allowed to 
decide - if the unlawfully dismissed employee is entitled to be reinstated 
or to be only paid by the employer an indemnity for damages18.  
Moreover, both the Italian Law and the Maltese one do not 
recognize the right of reinstatement of unlawfully dismissed employees 
“employed in such managerial or executive post” (please, see Section 81, 
par. 1st, of the EIRA and Art. 18 of the Law No. 300 of 1970). 
In conclusion, although a common corpus of rules directly 
applicable within EU does not exist and despite their apparent 
differences, the Maltese Legislative model and the Italian one seem – in 
practice - to blend together.  
 
                                                            
17 For an exhaustive framework on the matter of the correct meaning of the “fact does not 
subsist” mentioned by Art. 18, see M. PERSIANI, Il fatto rilevante per la reintegrazione del 
lavoratore illegittimamente licenziato, in Arg. Dir. Lav., 2013, 1 ss., who affirms such a fact 
has to be considered as the “material fact” and not as a “juridical fact”. 
18 With regards to the potential breach of the principle of equality, please see considerations 
under paragraph no. 6. 
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5. Reinstatement of unlawfully dismissed employees: 
Maltese case law compared to the Italian one. 
As mentioned earlier, according to the Maltese Law and the Italian 
one, judges may make an order of reinstatement or rehiring of unfairly 
dismissed employees. 
After analyzing Maltese judges’ decisions, it came to light that 
most of the disputes (about 80%) decided by such judges concern “unfair 
dismissals”19. 
In addition, it is important to note that the Maltese judges have – 
most of the time - declared “unfair” dismissals served to employees (i.e.: 
for lack of good and sufficient cause, for lack of grounds of redundancy, 
for breach of the provisions in the matter of maternity leave, etc.). 
Furthermore, the percentage of Maltese unlawfully dismissed 
employees reinstated-rehired is very low (about 7-10%). In fact, Maltese 
judges – in most cases – have ordered the employer to pay an indemnity 
for damages to such an employee instead of making an order of 
reinstatement-rehiring20.  
In particular, on the one hand, the Maltese judges have very often 
ascertained that it would not be “practicable … for the complainant to be 
reinstated or re-engaged by the employer”, taking – probably – into 
account relevant circumstances such as the breach of trust related to the 
employment. Therefore, in such cases, they have decided to make an 
order of compensation to be paid by the employer to the employee even 
if that employee asked to be reinstated-rehired.  
On the other hand, it is relevant to note that – most of the time 
(about 70%) – Maltese dismissed employees go before the Industrial 
Tribunal asking for the payment of an indemnity for damages and not for 
an order of reinstatement-rehiring. In other words, employees are rarely 
interested in going back to work at the enterprise where they have 
worked until their dismissal21. 
                                                            
19 Please, see decisions from 1993 till 2013 published on the “Industrial and Employment 
Relation swebsite”, 
http://industrialrelations.gov.mt/industryportal/industrial_relations/industrial_tribunal/ruling
s/trib_dec_2013.aspx. 
20 In this regard, see again Industrial Tribunal, 21st March 2013, no. 2215, in re Eric Micallef 
v. Bezzina Maritime Services where the Tribunal has decided to make an order of 
compensation (€ 4.000,00), although the dismissed employee asked for the reinstatement; 
Id., 18th September 2012, no. 2172, in re Roderick Camilleri v. Polidano Group. 
21 In this regard, see Industrial Tribunal, 10th July 2012, no. 2160, in re Shaun Bonello v. 
HSBC plc, where that Tribunal expressly state that the employee has not asked for the 
reinstatement, but for the compensation. 
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Therefore, in Malta, the most common protection measure applied 
by the Industrial Tribunal is definitely the order of compensation.  
In this regard, the amount of compensation to be paid by the 
employer to the Maltese unlawfully dismissed employee seems – often - 
very low if it is compared to the one which is usually paid to the Italian 
employee (i.e.: pursuant to Art. 18, par. 3nd, in case of unfair dismissal 
for lack of just cause or subjective reasons, the indemnity amounts to 
fifteen months of salary compared to the overall actual annual 
compensation; pursuant to Art. 18, par. 6th, in case of unfair dismissal for 
lack of objective reasons, that indemnity ranges between a minimum of 6 
up to maximum of twelve months of salary compared to the overall 
actual annual compensation).  
In fact, as earlier mentioned, pursuant to Art. 81 of the EIRA, the 
Maltese judge has the power to determine the amount of such a 
compensation on the basis of his/her discretion and in accordance with 
equity, taking into account “the real damages and losses incurred by the 
worker who was unjustly dismissed as well as other circumstances, 
including the worker’s age and skills as may affect the employment 
potential of the said worker” (please, see Art. 81, par. 2nd, of the EIRA). 
The amount of compensation as determined by Maltese judges is 
probably often low because such judges try to “strike a balance” between 
the right of employees to be protected in case of unfair dismissal (i.e.: 
considering also the time spent by the employee without working after 
his/her dismissal, his/her behaviour during the entire employment, 
potential previous warnings, …) and enterprises’ interest not to be 
“burdened” with too high payments. In fact, those payments could 
probably affect the overall profits of enterprises (i.e.: especially of the 
small ones) impacting negatively on the other workers employed at the 
same enterprises.  
However, that may probably lead at increasing the percentage of 
dismissals in Malta. In fact, Maltese employers may “feel free” to easily 
terminate employments, since, on the one hand, the calculated-risk to be 
condemned to reinstate-rehire dismissed employees is – nowadays - very 
low and, on the other hand, the amount of compensation to be paid to 
such employees is – in most cases – quite low.  
In Italy, upon winning their case, a lot of employees decide to be 
reinstated rather than opting for the indemnity for damages provided by 
Art. 18, par. 3nd, of the Law No. 300 of 1970. 
But why do Italian employees ask – most of the time - to be 
reinstated at the previous workplace, while the Maltese ones prefer – 
most of the time – to terminate the employment with the employer who 
18 ANGELA BRUNO 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 116/2015 
dismissed them? Answering to that question requires to examine the 
Maltese and Italian economic, social and cultural contexts. 
In particular, Maltese employees currently have more chances to 
be reemployed after being dismissed than the ones given to Italian 
employees. In fact, in Malta, there are considerable job opportunities as 
confirmed, on the one hand, by the fact that the percentage of 
unemployment is very low and – on the other hand – by the fact that a 
lot of foreigners (including Italians) move to Malta looking for a job.  
Therefore, Maltese unfairly dismissed employees do not normally 
have a real interest in going back to work at the previous enterprise. 
Often, such employees have already found a new job before taking legal 
action against their employers or they may find a new job during the 
trial.  
In Italy, the “context” is completely different, since the percentage 
of unemployment is very high. Therefore, Italian employees, unlike the 
Maltese ones, tend to find it harder to find a new job shortly after being 
dismissed. Therefore, such employees ask the judge to make an order of 
reinstatement going back to the previous enterprise.  
Moreover, the Italian Employees’ Trade Unions attempted to 
prevent the Italian Government from approving the so-called Jobs Act 
which prescribed a new amendment to Art. 18. Such an amendment 
provide, on the one hand, a “new weakening” of employees’ right of 
reinstatement in case of unlawful dismissal (i.e.: especially in case of 
unlawful dismissal for lack of objective reasons) and, on the other hand, 
an increasing number of cases where judges will have to make an order 
of compensation22. 
6. Final remarks. 
Finally, I should like to say one more thing with reference to that 
study. 
Firstly, as earlier said, Art. 18 of the Law No. 300 of 1970 and 
Section 81 of the EIRA grant, respectively, the Italian judge and the 
Maltese one with the power to decide between the order of reinstatement 
and the order of payment of an indemnity for damages. 
Moreover, another similarity between those legislative models may 
be identified in the fact that both the Italian legislator and the Maltese 
                                                            
22 Please, see A. BOSCATI, La politica del Governo Renzi per il settore pubblico tra 
conservazione e innovazione: il cielo illuminato diverrà luce perpetua?, in WP C.S.D.L.E. 
“Massimo D’Antona”, IT, 6 novembre 2014, no. 228; A. GARILLI, Occupazione e diritto del 
lavoro. Le politiche del lavoro del governo Renzi, in WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”, IT, 
20 ottobre 2014, no. 226. 
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one have provided judges with the power to choose measures to be 
applied in case of unfair dismissal.  
In fact, on the one hand, the Maltese judge is expressly allowed to 
decide between the order of the reinstatement-rehiring or the order of 
compensation to be paid by the employer to the unlawfully dismissed 
employee (please, see again Section 81 of the EIRA).  
On the other hand, in case of lack of just cause or subjective 
reasons, the Italian judge is allowed to decide, case by case, which is the 
quid pluris that - according to Art. 18, par. 4th, of the Law No. 300 of 
1970 – may lead such a judge to ascertain whether “the fact does not 
subsist” (and consequently the unlawfully dismissed employee is entitled 
to be reinstated) or not (and consequently the same employee is entitled 
to obtain only the payment of an indemnity for damages). The Italian 
judge is also allowed to decide whether or not to apply such provisions if 
he/she ascertains that “the contested behaviour that grounded for 
objective reasons does not clearly subsist”. 
Unlike such cases, the Italian judge has to make an order of 
compensation to be paid by the employer to the complainant (please, see 
Art. 18, par. 5th and 7th). 
However, the Italian legislator does not specify what is the quid 
pluris according to which “the contested behaviour that grounded for 
objective reasons” should be considered as “not clearly subsisted”, 
granting, in this way, the Italian judge with the power to make any 
evaluations in this matter and – consequently – to state, case by case, 
whether to make an order of reinstatement or an order of compensation. 
Therefore, another similarity seems to exist between the Italian 
and the Maltese Legislative models, since both those models provide 
judges with similar powers. 
However, the “real” difference between the Maltese Law and the 
Italian one in the matter of protection measures to be applied in case of 
unfair dismissal involve employees’ approach to such measures. In fact - 
as mentioned earlier - Maltese unlawfully dismissed employees very 
rarely ask the judge to make an order of reinstatement/rehiring. Instead, 
they prefer to opt for the order of compensation.  
Furthermore, Maltese judges seldom decide to order the 
reinstatement of the unlawfully dismissed employee, considering - “in 
accordance with equity” – such order “would [not] be practicable”. Those 
judges prefer very often to make an order of compensation to be paid by 
employers to complainants, even if such complainants have expressly 
asked to be reinstated. 
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Firstly, this is due to the fact that the relationship between the 
employee and the employer has been inevitably damaged by reason of 
dismissal. 
On the other hand, as often pointed out by Maltese judges through 
their decisions, a lot of employees find a “new” job shortly after being 
dismissed. Therefore, those employees do not have a real interest in 
going back to work at the previous enterprise. 
On the contrary, Italian dismissed employees very often have a lot 
of difficulties in finding a new job and – consequently – in coming back to 
the “Labour Market”. In this context, such employees very often ask to be 
reinstated although they are aware of the breach of trust affecting the 
relationship with employers. Moreover, the order of reinstatement has 
always been considered by Italian employees and their Trade Unions as 
an “untouchable” protection measure.  
That leads us to ask a question: which is the most effective 
protection that may be granted to unlawfully dismissed employees? Does 
such protection really consist in granting those employees with the 
chance to be reinstated? 
Formulating a thorough answer to such questions goes beyond the 
scope of this research.  
At the moment, it could be only said that the most effective 
protection should consist in providing employees with concrete chances to 
be re-employed at a different enterprise from which they have worked 
before being dismissed. In fact, such employees may be really protected 
not through an order of reinstatement or compensation made by judges, 
but through a new legislative model that essentially can increase chances 
of finding a new job.  
In this regard, it has been considered that, in October, 
unemployment among under 25s in Italy rose to the record level of 
44.2% with many others living in a state of chronic underemployment. 
79% of under 30s live in their parental home and the average age for 
achieving ‘economic independence’ is 35.  
By the way, the so-called Jobs Act has recently “announced” a new 
amendment to Art. 18, dividing opinion in Italy, with Trade Unions voicing 
opposition and backing a number of demonstrations by workers against 
the changes. In fact, Renzi’s Jobs Act is a package of policies designed to 
instill greater flexibility in the Italian Labour Market, commonly seen as 
one of the most uncompetitive in Europe. In particular, the current 
Labour Reform should encourage Italian employers to hire new “staff” 
and help reducing unemployment.  
Its key objectives are: 
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• a reduction of the number of short-term contracts, which 
increased significantly during the last crisis; 
• a simplification of the many rules of the Labour Code; 
• a review of the system of protections and safeguards, mainly for 
senior workers. 
As earlier explained, such measures include also a revision of 
Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute which is in place to prevent companies 
downsizing during a crisis. 
In fact, pursuant to the new “most controversial” Art. 18, 
employees dismissed on the basis of economic reasons will no longer be 
entitled to ask for reinstatement but they will only qualify for redundancy 
payments.  
In particular, the right of reinstatement will be maintained only for 
“invalid” and discriminatory dismissals. In fact, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Jobs Act, in case of unjustified disciplinary dismissals 
(i.e.: dismissals for “just cause” and for “subjective reasons”), unlawfully 
dismissed employees will be entitled to be reinstated only in the event 
that the grounds for the dismissal “do not exist”. 
However, it is not clear how the “weakening” of employee’s right 
of reinstatement may “encourage” Italian employers to easily hire other 
employees and consequently increase the employment rate. The 
government’s goal is probably to have business return to hiring people 
with an open-ended contract (a type of employment that today 
represents just 15% of new hires). But will Italian employers be really 
encouraged to hire easily employees? And what kind of employment 
contracts will be offered to such employees? 
On the other hand, the regulation provided by the Jobs Act with 
regards to indefinite-term contract seems much more useful. 
In particular, the Jobs’ Act is firstly aimed at reducing those types 
of contracts considered as “precarious” and encouraging employers to 
hire employees under indefinite-term contracts. 
In fact, as demonstrated by OECD research23, Italy possesses the 
most flexible Labour Market in the EU. This is certainly evident from the 
perspective of working contracts. The country has 46 kinds of contractual 
arrangement, 41 of which can be classified as ‘precarious’. This is why 
the Italian State has tried to instill ‘flexibility’ many times before through 
the Treu Law in 1997, the Biagi Law in 2003 and most recently the 2012 
                                                            
23 Please, see OECD-Better Policies for better lives, in 
http://data.oecd.org/italy.htm#profile-jobs. 
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Fornero Law24, which itself was designed to “facilitate entry into the 
labour market”. 
In this context, Italy’s employers have shown in years to dislike 
offering employees permanent jobs simply because they perceive 
employment costs to be far too high. Italy’s reams of red tape coupled 
with the difficulty of sacking full-time employees and high taxes make 
short term contracts which allow employees to be dumped easily when 
they are no longer useful or when the law requires their contracts 
become permanent, highly attractive. Moreover, Italian employers have 
very often abused such “precarious” contracts. In fact, although such 
contracts are – in the majority of cases – self employment contracts, 
employers often use them to hide the real employment relationships. 
Therefore, on the one hand, the worker is prevented from enjoying all the 
rights recognized to employees by the Law in force in Italy and, on the 
other hand, the employer incurs lower costs than ones which he would 
incur in the event that the worker is recognized as an “employee”.  
The downside is that with these disposable contracts (and 
employees), Italy has ended up with a massively unstable employment. 
Italy’s employers have gone to great lengths to ensure that employment 
contacts can be terminated once an employee becomes potentially too 
costly. On the other side of the coin, there are poorly performing 
employees who cannot be sacked because of laws in Italy that are overly 
protective of employees with permanent work contracts. This 
phenomenon has rendered short term contracts even more appealing for 
Italian employers. 
Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Jobs Act, on 
the one hand, contracts considered as “precarious” should be “organized” 
(i.e.: reduced in their amount) by means of decrees approved by the 
Italian Government. 
On the other hand, the Italian Jobs Act is aimed at encouraging 
employers to sign indefinite-term contracts, granting employees with 
protection measures (i.e.: compensation) in proportion to their seniority 
(i.e.: the so-called “contratti a tutele crescenti”). 
In particular, while the Italian Government, on one side, has 
recently approved the first Legislative Decree aimed at providing the 
necessary measures for the so-called "increasing tutelage contract" 
(i.e.:"contratto a tutele crescenti") and the Trade Unions, on the other 
side, are asking the Government not to decrease the traditional legal 
protection measures against unfair dismissals, the best way of protecting 
                                                            
24 Please, see again A. GARILLI, Occupazione e diritto del lavoro. Le politiche del lavoro del 
governo Renzi, in WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”, IT, 20 ottobre 2014, no. 226. 
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unlawfully dismissed employees seem guaranteed by means of the “new” 
following provisions: subsidies to incentivize self re-employment after 
dismissal and self business (please, see Art. 1, par. 4-b, of the so called 
"Jobs Act"); shareholding and stakeholding by employees and buyout of 
societies being affected by a financial crisis (please, see art. 1, par. 2-
a/5, and par. 4-b of the so called "Jobs Act"); re-composition of the 
fragmented "freelance" work contracts panorama and transformation of 
undeclared work into regular employment by extending traceable 
voucher. 
In conclusion, will the last Italian Labour Reform actually lead the 
Italian population to full employment or should we wait for another 
reform?  
